Abstract-Cloud computing is popularizing the computing paradigm in which data is outsourced to a third-party service provider (server) for data mining. Outsourcing, however, raises a serious security issue: how can the client of weak computational power verify that the server returned correct mining result? In this paper, we focus on the specific task of frequent itemset mining. We consider the server that is potentially untrusted and tries to escape from verification by using its prior knowledge of the outsourced data. We propose efficient probabilistic and deterministic verification approaches to check whether the server has returned correct and complete frequent itemsets. Our probabilistic approach can catch incorrect results with high probability, while our deterministic approach measures the result correctness with 100 percent certainty. We also design efficient verification methods for both cases that the data and the mining setup are updated. We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our methods using an extensive set of empirical results on real datasets.
INTRODUCTION
T HE increasing ability to generate vast quantities of data presents technical challenges for efficient data mining. Outsourcing data mining computations to a third-party service provider (server) offers a cost-effective option, especially for data owners (clients) of limited resources. This introduces the data-mining-as-a-service (DMaS) paradigm. Cloud computing provides a natural solution for the DMaS paradigm. A few active industry projects, for example, Google's Prediction APIs and Microsoft's Daytona project, provide cloud-based data mining as a service to users.
In this paper, we focus on frequent itemset mining as the outsourced data mining task. Informally, frequent itemsets refer to a set of data values (e.g., product items) whose number of co-occurrences exceeds a given threshold. Frequent itemset mining has been proven important in many applications such as market data analysis, networking data study, and human gene association study. Previous research has shown that frequent itemset mining can be computationally intensive, due to the huge search space that is exponential to data size as well as the possible explosive number of discovered frequent itemsets [15] . Therefore, for those clients of limited computational resources, outsourcing frequent itemset mining to computationally powerful service providers (e.g., the cloud) is a natural solution.
Although it is advantageous to achieve sophisticated analysis on tremendous volumes of data in a cost effective way, end users hesitate to place full trust in cloud computing. This raises serious security concerns. One of the main security issues is the integrity of the mining result. There are many possible reasons for the service provider to return incorrect answers [3] . For instance, the service provider would like to improve its revenue by computing with less resources while charging for more. Since sometimes the mining results are so critical that it is imperative to rule out errors during the computation, it is important to provide efficient mechanisms to verify the result integrity of outsourced data mining computations.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of verifying whether the server returned correct and complete frequent itemsets. By correctness, we mean that all itemsets returned by the server are frequent. By completeness, we mean that no frequent itemset is missing in the returned result.
Wong et al. [14] initialized the research on integrity verification of outsourced frequent itemset mining. Its basic idea is to insert some fake items that do not exist in the original dataset into the outsourced data. These fake items will construct a set of fake (in)frequent itemsets. Then by checking against the fake (in)frequent itemsets, the client can verify the correctness and completeness of the mining answer by the server. Their assumption is that the server has no background knowledge of the items in the outsourced datasets, thus it has equal probability to cheat on the fake and true itemsets. We argue that such assumption may not stand in practise, as the server may be able to possess prior knowledge of outsourced data (e.g., domain values of items and their frequency) from other sources [11] . Apparently such server can escape easily from the verification mechanism in [14] that is based on using fake items. Moreover, the server may also be aware of the knowledge of verification techniques, and tries to escape verification by utilizing such knowledge. Our goal is to design efficient and robust integrity verification methods to catch such server that may return incorrect and incomplete frequent itemsets. In particular, we make the following contributions. First, we design the probabilistic approach to catch mining result that does not meet the predefined correctness/ completeness requirement with high probability. The key idea is to construct a set of (in)frequent itemsets from real items, and use these (in)frequent itemsets as evidence to check the integrity of the server's mining results. We do not use any fake item as in [14] that does not exist in the original dataset to construct evidence (in)frequent itemsets.
Second, we design the deterministic approach to catch any incorrect/incomplete frequent itemset mining answer with 100 percent probability. The key idea of our deterministic solution is to require the server to construct cryptographic proofs of the mining results. Both correctness and completeness of the mining results are measured against the proofs with 100 percent certainty.
Third, for both probabilistic and deterministic approaches, we provide efficient methods to deal with updates on both the outsourced data and the mining setup.
Last but not least, we complement our analytical results with extensive experiments evaluating the performance of our verification approaches. Our experimental results show that the probabilistic approach can achieve the desired verification guarantee with small overhead, while our deterministic approach provides higher security guarantee with overhead more than the probabilistic approach.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss preliminaries in Section 2. We present our probabilistic approach and deterministic approach in Section 3 and 4 respectively. We discuss possible extension of our work in Section 5. In Section 6, we evaluate the performance of our approach. We discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES

Frequent Itemset Mining
Given a transaction dataset D that consists of n transactions, let I be the set of unique items in D. The support of the itemset I I (denoted as sup D ðIÞ) is the number of transactions in D that contain I. An itemset I is frequent if its support is no less than a support threshold min sup [1] . Clearly the search space of all frequent itemsets is exponential to the number of items in D. The (in)frequent itemsets behave the following monotone property. For any given infrequent itemset I, any itemset I 0 s.t. I I 0 must be an infrequent itemset. Similarly, for any frequent itemset I, any itemset I 0 I must be a frequent itemset.
Outsourcing Setting
The data owner (client) outsources her dataset D, with the minimum support threshold min sup , to the service provider (server). The server performs frequent itemset mining on the received dataset and returns the mining results to the client. We allow the client to use privacy-preserving frequent itemset mining algorithms [6] , [11] to encrypt the dataset; in this case the server will return the accurate itemsets in encrypted format.
Untrusted Server
We consider two types of untrusted servers that may return erroneous answer: the type-1 server that possesses the background knowledge of the outsourced dataset, including the domain of items and their frequency information, and the type-2 server that is aware of the frequency distribution information of both items and transactions, as well as the details of the verification procedure. In this paper, we target at designing verification approaches to catch these two types of servers.
Cryptographic Background
Bilinear pairings [19] . Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups of order q for some large prime q. Let e : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 be a bilinear pairing with the following properties: (1) Bilinearity: there exists a bilinear map e :
Þ ab for all P 1 ; P 2 2 G 1 and a; b 2 Z of prime order q; (2) Non-degeneracy: eðg; gÞ 6 ¼ 1, i.e., not all pairs in G 1 Â G 1 are sent to the identity in G 2 by e; (3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute eðP 1 ; P 2 Þ for all P 1 ; P 2 2 G 1 . Merkle hash trees. A Merkle hash tree [20] is an authenticated data structure that allows data integrity verification. It is a binary tree T in which each leaf node l is assigned the value h l ¼ hashðljjT ½lÞ, while each non-leaf node with children a and b is assigned the value h l ¼ hashðh a jjh b Þ, where hash is a collision-resistant hash function. An important algorithm MTproofðv; T Þ is equipped with a Merkle hash tree T , which outputs a proof showing that the digest value v is indeed the value stored in T . In particular, let pathðiÞ be a list of nodes on the path from leaf i to the root and sibðjÞ denote a sibling of node j in T . Then MTproofðÞ outputs the ordered list containing the hashes of the siblings sibðjÞ of the nodes j in pathðiÞ. For example, consider the Merkle tree T in Fig. 1 , and the value h 1 . Then MTproofðÞ returns fh 2 ; h 34 g. The complexity of MTproofðÞ is Oðlog 2 jT jÞ. How to use the Merkle tree for verification will be discussed in Section 4.2.
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH
The key idea of our methods is to construct a set of (in)frequent itemsets from real items, and use these (in)frequent itemsets as evidence to check the integrity of the server's mining result. We remove real items from the original dataset to construct artificial evidence infrequent itemsets (EIs), and insert copies of items that exist in the dataset to construct artificial evidence frequent items (EFs).
Verification Goal
Before discussing the detailed approaches, we formally define the correctness and completeness of the frequent itemset mining result. Let F be the real frequent itemsets in the outsourced database D, and F S be the result returned by the server. We define the precision P of F S as P ¼ jF \F S j jF S j (i.e., the percentage of returned frequent itemsets that are correct), and the recall R of F S as R ¼ jF \F S j jF j (i.e., the percentage of correct frequent itemsets that are returned). The aim of our probabilistic approaches is to catch any answer that does not meet the predefined precision/recall requirement with high probability. Formally, given a dataset D, let F s be the set of frequent itemsets returned by the server. Let pr R and pr P be the probability to catch F s of recall R a 1 and precision P a 2 , where a 1 ; a 2 2 ½0; 1 are given thresholds. We say a verification method M can verify ða 1 ; b 1 Þ-completeness (ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness, resp.) if pr R ! b 1 (pr P ! b 2 , resp.), where b 1 2 ½0; 1 (b 2 2 ½0; 1, resp.) is a given threshold. Our goal is to find a verification mechanism that can verify ða 1 ; b 1 Þ-completeness and ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness.
Construction of Evidence Frequent Itemsets (EFs)
Our basic idea of completeness verification is that the client uses a set of frequent itemsets as the evidence, and checks whether the server misses any evidence frequent itemset in its returned result. If it does, the incomplete answer by the server is caught with 100 percent certainty. Otherwise, the client believes that the answer is complete with a probability. We have:
Theorem 3.1. Given the frequent itemsets F S returned by the server with recall R, the probability pr R of catching the incomplete answer with ' evidence frequent itemsets (EFs) is
Clearly, to satisfy ða 1 ; b 1 Þ-completeness (i.e., pr R ! b 1 ), it must be true that ' ! dlog a 1 ð1 À b 1 Þe. Our analysis shows that with high completeness probability catching a server that fails to return even a small fraction of frequent itemsets does not need a large number of EFs. For instance, when a 1 ¼ 0:95 (i.e., 5 percent of frequent itemsets are not returned) and b 1 ¼ 0:95, we only need 58 EFs. Apparently that the number of required EFs is independent from the size of the dataset as well as the number of real frequent itemsets. Therefore our verification approach is especially suitable for efficient verification for large datasets.
We propose the MiniGraph approach to construct EFs. Intuitively, we pick a set of item seeds for EF construction (Step 1), and find a set of real infrequent itemsets that contains at least one seed (Step 2 & 3). We take these infrequent itemsets as EFs and add fake transactions to make them artificially frequent (Step 4). Below we explain the details of the four steps of the MiniGraph approach.
Step 1: We pick the infrequent 1-itemset of the largest frequency as I seed . The purpose of doing so is to reduce the number of artificial transactions added by Step 4. If there is no such 1-itemset, we pick the infrequent 2-itemset of the largest support. Note that I seed is not infrequent anymore in the outsourced dataset after inserting artificial transactions.
Step 2: We find the transactions D seed D that contain I seed , and construct the MiniGraph G from D seed . The root of G corresponds to I seed . Each non-root node in G responds to a transaction in D seed . There is an edge from node N i to node N j in G if the transaction that node N j corresponds to is the smallest superset of the transaction of node N i . Each node is labeled with an integer denoting the frequency of its corresponding transaction. Note that since I seed is infrequent, the frequency of each node in MiniGraph does not exceed min sup .
Step 3: We select ' nodes from the second level of G as EFs, where ' is the number of required EFs that satisfy ða 1 ; b 1 Þ-completeness. The itemsets that the picked nodes correspond to are EFs. If there are not sufficient itemsets to select, we add the next infrequent 1-itemset of the largest frequency as another I seed , and repeat Step 1-3, until we either find ' EFs or there is no infrequent 1-itemset left. If it cannot return enough EFs, we will continue the same procedure from the lower levels of G. It is easy to see that the maximum number of EFs that can be constructed by MiniGraph approach is 2 x À 2, where x is the number of infrequent items in D. We assume that 2
x À 2 ! ', i.e., there are always sufficient EF candidates.
Step 4: For each picked EF : (1) we compute its support f as the total frequency of all its descendants and itself; (2) we compute the number of itemsets that need to be added as ðmin sup À fÞ; and (3) we construct ðmin sup À fÞ artificial transactions, each being a copy of EF . These artificial transactions are inserted into D.
Construction of Evidence Infrequent Itemsets (EIsÞ
Similar to the completeness verification, our basic idea of correctness verification is that the client uses a set of infrequent itemsets as the evidence, and checks whether the server returns any evidence infrequent itemset. Next, we show how to measure the correctness probability guarantee. Similar to the completeness probability guarantee, we have:
Given the frequent itemsets F S returned by the server with precision P , the probability pr P of catching the incorrect answer with ' EIs is pr P ¼ 1 À P ' .
To satisfy ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness (i.e., pr P ! b 2 ), it must satisfy that ' ! dlog a 2 ð1 À b 2 Þe. As pr P and pr R (Theorem 3.1) are measured in the similar way, we have the same observation as for the completeness verification, which is that with high probability catching a server that returns even a small fraction of wrong frequent itemsets does not need large number of EIs. Furthermore, the number of required EIs is independent from the database size and the number of real frequent itemsets.
We propose the lattice-based approach to construct EIs. Specifically, we consider all infrequent 1-itemsets as EIs. If the number of such 1-itemsets is not sufficient to satisfy ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness, we transform a number of frequent 1-itemsets to be infrequent for additional EIs (Step 1). For those EIs that are frequent in the original dataset, we pick the minimum number of transactions (Step 2), and delete the minimum number of items (Step 3) from these transactions to make all EIs infrequent. Next, we explain the details of the lattice-based approach.
Step 1: Pick evidence infrequent itemsets (EIs). First, we first all infrequent 1-itemsets. We exclude the I seed used for EF construction from the set of 1-itemset candidates, so that I seed and all its supersets will not be considered as the EI candidates. This ensures that no itemset will be required to be EI and EF at the same time. Let x be the number of infrequent 1-itemsets. These x infrequent 1-itemsets are inserted into the evidence repository R. If x > ', where ' is the number of EIs required to satisfy ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness (i.e., there are sufficient number of EIs), we terminate construction of EIs; otherwise, we continue. Let h be the minimal value to make
where m is the number of unique items in D, and x is the number of infrequent items in D. Also let k be the minimal value to make k h À Á ! ' À x. We pick the first k frequent 1-itemsets S 1item from the sorted list of items. We construct all h-itemset candidates S hitem that contain h items from S 1item , and insert those h-itemset candidates that have non-zero support into R. If jRj < ' (i.e., there is insufficient number of EIs), we pick the next k 0 sorted items S 0 1item after S 1item in the sorted list, where
as well as k ¼ k þ k 0 , and repeat Step 1.4, until there are at least ' h-itemsets of non-zero supports. If all unique items are inserted into S 1item but there are fewer than ' EIs, we increase h by 1, and repeat the procedure, until R has ' EIs.
For transaction datasets that have large number of infrequent 1-itemsets, the algorithm terminates early without the need to remove any item. It has been shown [4] that in reallife transaction datasets, the item support distribution (as well as the itemset support distribution) follows a powerlaw distribution: it is highly likely that there are large number of infrequent 1-itemsets. This is advantageous as in practice, the correctness verification can be achieved without changing the database.
Step 2: Pick transactions for item removal. Out of ' EIs picked by Step 1, some of them are infrequent in D and some are indeed frequent. We do not need to take any action on the real infrequent itemsets RI. We aim at transforming those frequent EIs into artificial infrequent EIs (notated as AI). To achieve this, we pick a set of transactions D 0 D, so that for each frequent itemset I 2 AI, sup D 0 ðIÞ ! sup D ðIÞ À min sup þ 1. In other words, for each I, its support will be decreased to at most min sup À 1 after their instances in D 0 are removed. We aim at finding the minimal set of such D 0 . To help pick D 0 , we construct the transaction matrix M of D. M is a u Â n binary matrix, where u is the number of itemsets in AI, and n is the number of transactions in D. M½i; j = 1 means that the frequent itemset I i appears in transaction T j ; otherwise, M½i; j = 0. We also define a n-length binary vector V , in which V ½i = 1 means that the i-th transaction is picked. Let A ¼ M Â V . Apparently A½i equals the number of picked transactions that contain the i-th frequent itemsets in AI. Then the problem of finding the transactions D 0 for transforming AI to be infrequent is equivalent to finding a n-length binary vector V such that
Then we calculate V such that: (1) M Â V ¼ A, and (2) V is a binary vector. To satisfy (1), we calculate
If V is a binary vector, we return V . Otherwise, we pick the smallest value in A, and increase it by 1 (i.e. allow more instances to be removed). If there are multiple entries in A of the same values, we break the tie randomly. Whenever we update A, we increment the relaxed cost (initialized as 0) by 1. We repeat the calculation of V , until either there is a V to be returned or the amount of relaxed cost exceeds a given threshold.
Step 3: Pick item instances for removal. Given the transactions D 0 obtained by Step 2, we need to decide which items in D 0 will be removed. We aim at minimizing the total number of removed items. To address this issue, we put high priority on removing the items that are shared among patterns in AI. Therefore, we do the following to pick the items. First, for each unique item in AI, we count its frequency in AI. Second, we sort the items by their frequency in descending order. Third, we construct the item matrix IM of AI. IM is a u Â y binary matrix, where u is the number of itemsets in AI, and y is the number of unique items in AI. In the matrix, IM½i; j = 1 means that the frequent itemset I i contains the item i j ; otherwise, IM½i; j = 0. Then we repeat the following procedure on IM. We add the item that corresponds to the first column of IM to the output, update IM by removing all rows i such that IM½i; 1 ¼ 1 (i.e., all patterns that contain the item of the largest support), and resort the columns in the updated IM by their sum in descending order. We repeat until IM becomes empty. The sequence of the removed columns outputs the items to be picked for removal.
After item removal, by following the property of the downward closure of infrequentness, the client adds all descendant itemsets of the EIs picked by Step 1 that are of non-zero support into the evidence repository R. Furthermore, we are aware that changing frequent itemsets to be infrequent will modify all of its frequent descendants to be infrequent. This will lead to incomplete frequent itemsets even when the server is honest. To solve this problem, for each descendant itemset of AI that is added to R, we count its support and mark it as recoverable if it is frequent. Those recoverable itemsets are maintained locally by the client and will be added back to the mining result from the server. Finding recoverable frequent itemsets completes the construction of EIs.
Robustness Analysis
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our verification approach based on EF s and EIs.
Robustness of EFs. The type-1 server may compare the frequency of items between its background knowledge and that collected from the outsourced D 0 . It may notice that some items that are infrequent in D turn to be frequent in D 0 . Let these items be J. The server may choose not to cheat over the itemsets that contain any item in J. Note that J is a superset of all I seed items that are used for EF construction. Let pr be the probability that the attacker can escape verification based on EFs constructed from one specific I seed . Let j 1 and j 2 denote the number of I seed items and items other than I seed in J respectively. Then pr ¼
. Thus the probability that the attacker can escape verification based on EFs constructed from j 1 I seed items equals Pr ¼ 1 À ð1 À prÞ j 1 . The client may require g-security, i.e., the probability Pr that the attacker can escape the EF -based verification is no greater than g. To ensure g-security, we need to add artificial transactions to convert j 2 ¼ d
itemsets, besides I seed , to be artificially frequent in D 0 . The type-2 server is aware that the infrequent 1-itemset (s) with the largest frequency are always picked as I seed items. Therefore, the probability that the server can identify those I seed items (and thus escape the verification based on EFs constructed from these items) is 100 percent. To fix this issue, instead of picking I seed from infrequent items in descending order of frequency, the client has to pick I seed from the infrequent items randomly.
Robustness of EIs. The type-1 server may observe that the frequency drop of some items in the outsourced data and may decide not to cheat on EIs that contain these items. Let O be those items. Indeed, these items are those we choose to remove when constructing EIs. In this case, those EIs that contain any item of O would not be able to catch the server. Only kÀo h À Á EIs that do not contain any of O are still effective, where o is the number of items in O, and k is number of unique frequent items we pick to build h-itemsets as EIs. To fix this issue, we may require that o satisfies
where ' is the number of EIs required to satisfy ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness, and x is the number of infrequent items picked as EIs.
The type-2 server understands how EIs are constructed. Thus, it can infer that all infrequent 1-itemsets must be EIs, and thus reduce the catching probability from ð1 À Pr jEIj Þ to ð1 À Pr jAIj Þ, where AI are the set of EIs that are indeed frequent in D. To fix this problem, we require that jAIj ! '. But it is likely that we can not find sufficient number of AIs. In this case, the probabilistic approach fails to provide the required correctness guarantee.
Complexity Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the time and space complexity of our EF and EI construction.
EF Construction
The time and space complexity of the MiniGraph approach are OðjDjÞ and OðjGjÞ respectively, where G is the constructed MiniGraph. Normally jGj is a small portion of jDj. Compared with the complexity Oð2 m ) of frequent itemset mining, where m is the number of items in D, our verification preparation approach has cheaper overhead than mining locally.
EI Construction
The complexity of the lattice-based approach is OðjEIjjDjÞ. The complexity of removing item instances is OðyjAIjÞ, where y is the number of unique items in AI. Since jAIj jEIj and y < < jDj, the complexity of verification preparation for correctness verification is OðjEIjjDjÞ.
Update Operations
The client may need to update her data from time to time and/or want to continuously execute frequent itemset mining over the outsourced dataset with different min sup values. Let DD be the update over dataset D, and Dmin sup the change in min sup . For simplicity, we only consider insertion-only and deletion-only operations. We use jDDj to denote the size of DD. When DD corresponds to a sequence of deletions, we still consider jDDj as a positive value, which equals the number of deleted transactions. Dmin sup could be either positive or negative integer values. Next, we discuss how to adapt our verification method to deal with the update on the dataset, as well as the update on min sup .
When Dmin sup > 0. First, we discuss EF s update. The client has to ensure that the EF s are still frequent with regard to the new min sup . Therefore, for each itemset I 2 EF , if DfðIÞ ¼ Dmin sup À sup DD ðIÞ > 0, the client inserts DfðIÞ artificial copies of I to D. Otherwise, no update is needed on I.
Regarding EIs update, we will ensure the infrequentness of EIs after update. If DD is a sequence of insertions and jDDj ! Dmin sup , the client applies Step 2 and 3 in Section 3.3 on DD to make sure that DD does not change the infrequentness of EIs. Specifically, the matrix M is constructed from DD, while A is constructed as
Otherwise, no update on EIs is needed.
When Dmin sup 0. First, we discuss EF s update. When DD is constructed by deletion-only transactions and jDDj þ Dmin sup > 0, it is likely that a EF may turn to be infrequent. Therefore, for each I 2 EF , the client evaluates DfðIÞ ¼ sup DD ðIÞ þ Dmin sup . If DfðIÞ < 0, the client inserts jDfðIÞj copies of I to DD. Otherwise, there is no update on I.
Regarding EIs update, EIs may become frequent for the smaller min sup value. Therefore, the client checks sup D 0 ðIÞ for each I 2 EI, where D 0 is the dataset after update. Let f max ¼ maxfsup D 0 ðIÞjI 2 EIg. If f max ! min sup þ Dmin sup , the client applies the Step 2 and 3 in Section 3.3 on D 0 , with M constructed from D 0 , and A is constructed as following:
Complexity analysis. The time complexity of updates on EF s is OðjDDjÞ. The time complexity of update on EIs can be OðjDDjÞ (when Dmin sup > 0) or OðjD 0 jÞ (otherwise).
Post-Processing
Removal of artificial frequent itemsets is straightforward. As the client is aware of I seed that is contained in all EF s, it needs to remove all the returned frequent itemsets that contain I seed . Besides, we recover the original frequency of those itemsets that are contained by EF . Specifically, for any itemset I which is a subset of at least one EF ,
In this way, we eliminate those originally infrequent itemsets from the returned result.
To recover missing real frequent itemsets, the client maintains locally all AIs and their recoverable descendants when it constructs EIs. During post-processing, the client adds these AIs and the recoverable descendants back to F S as frequent itemsets.
DETERMINISTIC APPROACH
Our deterministic approach is based on an efficient authenticated data structure, which is built upon standard Merkle trees and bilinear-map accumulators. It enables the proofbased verification. We optimize the verification algorithm by reducing the number of proofs for both correctness and completeness verification. We show that a small number of proofs is sufficient to verify the correctness and completeness of a large set of frequent itemsets.
Set Intersection Verification Protocol
In this paper, we adapt the set intersection verification protocol [21] to our problem. Formally, given a collection sets S = fS 1 ; . . . ; S v g, E ¼ S 1 \ S 2 \ Á Á Á \ S v is the correct intersection of S if and only if:
Here the completeness condition is on the set intersection. To avoid confusion with our completeness verification of frequent itemsets, in the remainder of the paper, we use the term intersection completeness for the completeness condition on the set intersection.
Papamanthou et al. proposed a set intersection verification protocol to verify that E is the correct intersection of S [21] . Next, we explain the protocol details briefly.
Proof construction by the server. Given an intersection result E ¼ fe 1 ; . . . ; e d g, to prove that E ¼ S 1 \ . . . \ S v , the set intersection verification protocol requires the server to construct its proof PðEÞ that consists of four parts: (1) an encoding of the result (as a polynomial) as the coefficients B =fb d ; b dÀ1 ; . . . ; b 0 g of the polynomial ðs þ e 1 Þðs þ e 2 Þ Á Á Á ðs þ e d Þ, where s is a randomly chosen value by the client and kept as secret; (2) a set of accumulation values A =faccðS j Þj8S j 2 Sg which can be used to verify that the proof is indeed computed from the original dataset D; (3) the subset witness W = fW j j8S j 2 Sg as the proof of the subset condition; and (4) the intersection completeness witness C = fC j j8S j 2 Sg as the proof of the intersection completeness condition. The total complexity of proof construction is OðBlog 3 B þ m logmÞ, where B ¼ P v j¼1 jS j j, m is the number of leaves of the Merkle tree of the dataset D, and 2 ð0; 1Þ decides the number of levels of the Merkle tree (as ½1=). More details of the Merkle tree will be present in Section 4.2.
Correctness verification by the client. After receiving PðEÞ ¼ fB; A; W; Cg together with E, the client verifies the following: (1) whether the coefficients B are computed correctly by the server; (2) whether any given accumulation value in A is indeed calculated from the original dataset; (3) whether E satisfies the subset condition by using W; and (4) whether E satisfies the intersection completeness condition by using C. We omit the details of proof construction and verification due to limited space. Readers can refer to [21] for more details.
Basic Solution
In this section, we present our basic verification approach. We first present in Section 4.2.1 the authenticated data structure that we will design. Then in Section 4.2.2, we show how to adapt the set operation verification protocol to the problem of frequent itemset mining by utilizing the authenticated data structure. In Section 4.2.3, we discuss the robustness and weakness of the basic approach.
Authenticated Data Structure
Before sending the dataset D to the server, the client constructs an authenticated data structure. Before we discuss the details of the authenticated data structure, we first discuss the item-based inverted index. The authenticated data structure will be constructed from the inverted index. In particular, given a dataset D, its item-based inverted index E Now we are ready to discuss how to construct the authenticated data structure. We use the Merkle hash tree T of the inverted index as our authenticated data structure. In particular, the client picks a random value s 2 Z which is kept secret. Then, for each leaf l j of T that corresponds to the jth inverted list L j in E I , the client constructs
, where g is a generator of the group G 1 from an instance of bilinear pairing parameters. Then the client applies a collision-resistant hash function hashðÁÞ recursively over the nodes of T . Each leaf l j of T is assigned the value h j ¼ hashðv 1 jj . . . jjv w jjaccðl j ÞÞ, where v 1 ; . . . ; v w are the values in the jth inverted list L j that l j corresponds to, while each internal node v with children a and b is assigned to h v ¼ hashðh a jjh b Þ. The root of the tree is signed to produce signature sigðE I Þ. The client sends T to the server with D, and keeps sigðE I Þ locally. The complexity of constructing a Merkle tree of level d1=e levels and m leaves is Oðm þ HÞ, where 2 ð0; 1Þ is a user-specified constant, and H ¼ P m j¼1 jl j j. At this point, the client can find all frequent 1-itemsets and infrequent 1-itemsets from the inverted index. It maintains such information for later verification.
Verification Procedure
Before outsourcing the dataset D to the server, the client constructs the item-based inverted index E I of D, as well as the Merkle hash tree T of E I . The client keeps the hash value of the root element of T , and sends D and T to the server. Proof construction by the server. After the server receives D and T from the client, the server runs frequent itemset mining on D and discovers a set of frequent itemsets. Before the server sends its result F S to the client, it constructs proofs for correctness and completeness verification. In particular, for each itemset I 2 F S , the server constructs a proof PðIÞ [21] . Similarly, for each itemset I 6 2 F S , the server constructs a proof too. The proof of the itemset I 2 F S will be used for the correctness verification, while the proof of the itemset I 6 2 F S will be used for the completeness verification. Result verification by the client. After receiving the frequent itemsets F S , for each itemset I 2 F S and its proof PðIÞ ¼ fB; A; W; Cg, the client launches the following steps to verify that I is frequent (i.e., I is contained in at least min sup transactions T I ): (1) It checks the size of T I by checking whether jBj! min sup þ 1; (2) It verifies the validity of B2 PðIÞ; (3) For each accumulation value v 2 A that will be used in the following steps, it validates that v is indeed constructed from D by using the root element of T ; and (4) it verifies that I is indeed the correct intersection of all transactions in T I by using W and C. The completeness verification is very similar to the correctness verification, except the first step by which the client verifies whether jBj min sup .
The complexity of the verification of a single itemset I is OðjIjÞ. Given a set of itemsets F , the complexity of verifying its correctness/completeness is OðZÞ, where Z ¼ P 8I2F jIj. This shows that the required complexity of the verification depends only on the outcome of frequent itemset mining, but not on the size of the involved dataset. This makes our verification approaches especially suitable for outsourcing of large datasets.
Discussion
The basic verification approach is expensive, due to the fact that the total number of ( correctness and completeness) proofs is 2 m À 1, where m is the number of unique items of D. This will introduce considerable amounts of overhead at both the client and the server sides.
Verification Optimization
In this section, we discuss how to reduce the number of proofs for verification to improve the performance of verification at both server and client sides.
Before we discuss our optimization strategy, we introduce the lexicographic transaction subset tree (LTST ), which is adapted from [24] . Given a dataset D, assume there is a total lexicographic ordering of the items in the database. We say i j if item i occurs before item j in the ordering. We construct the transaction subset tree with the root being an empty set, while each internal node at level h of the tree contains a unique h-itemset that exists in D. There is an edge between a node N i at level h and a node N j at level ðh þ 1Þ if their corresponding itemsets I i ¼ fi 1 ; . . . ; i h g and I j ¼ fi 1 ; . . . ; i hþ1 g satisfy that I j À I i ¼ fi hþ1 g, where i hþ1 is immediately after i h in the ordering. Fig. 3 shows an example of LTST . Note that the downward closure of the infrequentness and the upward closure of the frequentness are hold in LTST . We decide the lexicographic order of the items by their frequency. The items of higher frequency are assigned with smaller orders. For those items of the same frequency, we break the tie by assigning an ordering of these items. The lexicographic ordering is guaranteed to be a total ordering scheme.
Given two LTST nodes N and N 0 , we say N consumes N 0 , denoted as N 0 " N, if the itemset that N 0 correspond to is contained in the itemset that N correspond to. Next, we define the (maximal) positive border (PB) and (minimal) negative border of a LTST tree.
Definition 4.1. Maximal positive border (MPB) Given a LTST L, its positive border consists of the nodes that corresponds to frequent itemsets but none of their children correspond frequent itemsets. Furthermore, we say a positive border node P is maximal if 6 9 a positive border node P 0 such that P " P 0 .
For those nodes that correspond to frequent itemsets but have no children, we consider them as PB nodes too.
Definition 4.2. Minimal Negative Border (MNB) Given a LTST
L, its negative border consists of the nodes that corresponds to infrequent itemsets while their parents correspond to frequent itemsets. Furthermore, we say a negative border node P is minimal if 6 9 a negative border node P 0 such that P 0 " P .
Consider the LTST L in Fig. 3 as an example, assume min sup ¼ 3. The positive border consist of ABC, AC, AD, BC, C, and D, and MPB consists of ABC and AD. Unlike the problem of mining the frequent itemsets that tries to find the positive and negative borders, our problem is to verify whether the MPB and MNB discovered by the server is correct. The verification of MPB ensures the correctness of returned itemsets, while the verification of MNB verifies the completeness of the returned itemsets.
Next we describe an efficient algorithm to find MPB and MNB of the server's returned answer F S . Given a set of frequent itemsets F S that is returned by the server, assume each of them is ordered by the lexicographic order of items. We traverse the LTST in a top-down fashion; for any node that corresponds to an itemset in F S , we mark it as frequent. After we finish node marking, on each path, we pick the lowest node that is marked as frequent as a positive border node, and the highest node that is not marked as frequent as a negative border node. The MPB (MNB, resp.) nodes are collected as those nodes whose corresponding itemsets are not contained in (contain, resp.) any other positive border (negative border, resp.) nodes.
Proof Construction at Server Side
To prepare for correctness verification, the server constructs a cryptographic proof [21] for each MPB node. Similarly, to prepare for completeness verification, the server constructs a cryptographic proof for each MNB node. The MNB nodes should include all infrequent 1-itemsets. To further reduce the number of proofs, the server only needs to construct the proofs of those MNB nodes of length greater than one that only contain frequent 1-itemsets. After the proof construction is finished, the server sends the proofs with F S to the client.
Verification at Client Side
Correctness verification. The correctness verification at the client side is straightforward. The client uses the server's proofs to verify that the itemset that each MPB node corresponds to is frequent by running the set intersection verification protocol. Though simple, sending proofs of only MPB nodes to the client raises two new issues. The first issue is that the client must ensure that the server has computed the proof of all MPB nodes of F S ; missing the proof of any MPB node may enable the server to escape from the verification. A naive method to verify the completeness of MPB nodes is that the client re-computes MPB from F S , which may end up with high time cost. We design a more efficient method as following. Given F S and the MPB nodes that are returned by the server, for each itemset I 2 F S , the client verifies whether there exists a MPB node whose corresponding itemset I 0 satisfy that I I 0 . If it does not, the client concludes that the server misses the proof of at least one MPB node.
Another issue is that the client needs to ensure that all MPB nodes are honestly constructed from F S , not from the (correct) mining result of D. Otherwise, the server may be able to escape from the verification. This can be achieved by verifying: (1) for each MPB node P , whether there exists an itemset I 0 2 F S such that I 0 I, where I is the corresponding itemset of P ; and (2) for each itemset I 2 F S , whether there exists a MPB node whose corresponding itemset I 0 satisfies that I I 0 . Completeness verification. First, the client has to verify that the server does not miss the proof of any MNB node. To do this, the client can construct MNB from MPB, assuming that it has verified that the proof of MPB nodes is correct and complete.
Assume now the server has passed the verification of MNB nodes, next, the client uses the proof of MNB nodes to prove the completeness of returned frequent itemsets (i.e., each itemset that is not returned must be infrequent). Before we discuss how the client verifies the completeness, we categorize the possible missing frequent itemsets into four types, based on their relationships with the returned frequent itemsets F S . In particular, consider a frequent itemset I that is not returned by the server, it should belong to one of the following four types:
Type-1 (non-overlap): For each itemset I 0 2 F S , I \ I 0 ¼ ;. Type-2 (subset): There exists a frequent itemset I 0 2 F S such that I I 0 . Type-3 (superset): There exists a frequent itemset I 0 2 F S such that I 0 I. Type-4 (overlap): There is no frequent itemset I 0 2 F S such that I I 0 or I 0 I. However, there exists a frequent itemset I 0 2 F S such that I \ I 0 6 ¼ ;.
Next, we describe how to verify these four types of missing frequent itemsets respectively.
Verification of type-1 missing itemsets. Since type-1 itemsets do not overlap with any frequent itemset in F S , any type-1 missing itemset must only contain frequent 1-itemsets that do not appear in F S . Therefore, to verify whether there is any type-1 missing frequent itemset, the client checks whether all frequent 1-itemsets of D are included in F S . If it does not, the client can conclude that there must exist at least one type-1 missing frequent itemset. The complexity of verification is OðjF S jÞ, as its major effort is to collect unique items in F S . Proof-based verification is not needed. The frequent 1-itemsets are collected when the client constructs the inverted index.
Verification of type-2 missing itemsets. This is equivalent to verifying whether all subsets of each itemset I 2 F S also exist in F S . To do this, the client verifies whether for each MPB node, all subsets of its corresponding itemset are included in F S . In this case, as long as I is frequent (verified by correctness verification), this verification procedure does not need to use any proof.
Verification of type-3 & type-4 missing itemsets. If there is any type-3/type-4 frequent itemset missing, the MNBs of F S include at least one node whose corresponding itemset is frequent. Therefore, the client verifies whether there exists any type-3/type-4 missing frequent itemsets by verifying the infrequentness of each MNB node via its proof (Section 4.2). If there exists any MNB node whose proof cannot show it is infrequent, there exists at least one type-3/type-4 missing itemset. The complexity of verification is OðXÞ, where X ¼ P 8I2MNB jIj.
Security Analysis
In this section, we will prove that although we reduce the number of proofs greatly, our verification optimization still provides the same security guarantee as our basic approach which requires correctness proofs for all itemsets in F S and completeness proofs for all itemsets that do not appear in F S , denoted as F S . Following our verification procedure, the client only checks proofs of MPB and MNB nodes.
In the aspect of correctness verification, as now the client only verifies the frequentness of all MPB nodes, our optimization eliminates the correctness proofs of all itemsets in F S À MPB. Next, we will show that for each itemset in F S À MPB, its proof can be consumed by the proof of at least one itemset in MPB. Note that for each itemset I in F S À MPB, there must exists an MPB itemset I 0 such that I I 0 . According to the upward closure of frequentness property of frequent itemsets, the frequentness of the MPB itemset I 0 ensures the frequentness of I. Our completeness verification optimization only needs the proofs of MNB nodes of F S . Similar to the proof above, we will show that for each itemset in F S À MNB, its proof can be consumed by the proof of at least one itemset in MNB. Here for each itemset I 0 2 F S À MNB, there must exists an MNB itemset I 0 such that I 0 I. According to the downward closure of infrequentness property, the infrequentness of the MNB itemset I 0 ensures the infrequentness of I.
Robustness Analysis
Robustness against Type-1 server. As the deterministic approach does not modify the outsourced data, the prior background knowledge about the data distribution does not change. Therefore, the type-1 server is not able to escape the verification.
Robustness against Type-2 server. As discussed in Section 4.5 and 4.6, our optimized deterministic approach is able to catch incorrect and incomplete mining result with 100 percent guarantee. The power of the verification approach relies on the cryptographic proof. The server may try to cheat the client by claiming some infrequent itemsets as frequent, and constructing (fake) proofs for these itemsets from the modified dataset with these itemsets inserted into some transactions that they do not belong to. For example, consider the transaction dataset in Fig. 2a . Assume min sup ¼ 4. If the server intends to cheat the client with the claim that I ¼ fi 2 ; i 3 g (support = 3) is a frequent itemset, it may insert i 3 into transaction T 8 , and return the proof as following: (1) B constructed from the four claimed transactions {T 1 , T 4 , T 7 , T 8 }, (2) A from the original Merkle tree T , and (3) the subset witness W and subset completeness proof C constructed from T 0 8 with i 3 inserted. Such proof will pass the verification of co-efficients and accumulation values, but fail the subset correctness proof as it uses the original correct accðL 3 Þ but incorrect co-efficients. Therefore, even though the server is aware of the authenticated data structure and proof construction procedure, it is not able to construct a correctness proof for an infrequent itemset and a completeness proof for a frequent itemset.
Complexity Analysis
Proof construction at server side. The total complexity of proof construction is OðY log 3 Y þ m logmÞ, where Y ¼ P I2MPB[MNB jIj, m is the number of unique items of D, and 2 ð0; 1Þ is a user-specified constant that is used to specify the number of levels of the Merkle tree.
Verification at client side. The complexity of type-3 & type-4 missing frequent itemsets of completeness verification dominates the completeness verification. Therefore the total complexity of verification is OðY Þ, where Y ¼ P 8I2MNB[MPB jIj. It is linear to the size of the returned mining result.
Upper bound of size of MPB and MNB nodes. The complexity of both proof construction and verification is linear to the size of MNB and MPB nodes. The number of MPB and MNB nodes, as well as the length of their corresponding itemsets, relies on the data distribution of the outsourced dataset and the support threshold min sup . But we can estimate the theoretical upperbound of total number of MNB and MPB nodes, as well as the total length of their corresponding itemsets. We do this by estimating the upperbound of number of NB and PB nodes. Assume there are p PB nodes. As all of their children are NB nodes, the maximum total number of such NB nodes is
2
. The other NB nodes are those infrequent nodes which are not children of any PB node. The maximum of the total number of such nodes is m ½ m 2 À p (i.e., these NB nodes and all PB nodes appear at the same level ½ m 2 . Therefore, the maximum of total number of PB and NB nodes c can be computed as:
The c value reaches the maximum when p ¼ m. Therefore,
These MPB and MNB nodes cover all possible itemsets of length ½ 
Update Operations
Update on min sup . The update on min sup does not change the authentication data structure. Therefore, no update is needed at the client side. Update on D. The update on D requires the client to update the data structure partially. Specifically, for any update of a leaf node L in the Merkle tree, only the nodes on the path from the root to L are to be updated. If the client inserts a transaction T ¼ fi 1 ; . . . ; i z g to D, T is to be added to the inverted lists L i 1 ; . . . ; L i z of the items in T . All the leaf nodes of the items in T and their ancestors in the Merkle tree are to be updated. After updating the Merkle tree, the client sends the updated structure to the server, together with the updated data. The proof construction at the server side is similar to Section 4.4. Specifically, the server constructs new cryptographic proofs for new MPB and MNB nodes. The client verifies the results against proofs in the same way.
DISCUSSION
Various Outsourcing Scenarios
There two types of outsourcing paradigm: (1) the infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) paradigm in which the client outsources both data and the data mining software to the service provide (server). The server provides storage and hardware for the computation. A typical IaaS example is Amazon EC2 Web Service; (2) the software-as-a-service (SaaS) paradigm in which the client only outsources data to the server, while the server runs its own mining software on the outsourced data. We believe that our verification methods can be applied to both paradigms. This is because that frequent itemset mining is deterministic in the sense that the output is fixed for a given dataset and min sup , no matter how the algorithm is implemented.
Extension to Other Data Mining Algorithms
In general, our strategy of constructing cryptographic proofs for verification (for deterministic guarantee) and artificial verification objects (for probabilistic guarantee) can be applied to most data mining algorithms. The challenge is that the design of proofs and verification objects has to be customized for different data mining algorithms. Below we discuss briefly how to extend our approaches to association rule mining, which is related to frequent itemset mining. The association rule mining aims to find association rules that meet the pre-defined support and confidence threshold value min sup and min conf . First, for the probabilistic approach, we can build evidence association rules EF i ! EF j by constructing two evidence frequent itemsets EF i and EF j , requiring that EF i & EF j and
. EF i and EF j can be constructed by using our MiniGraph approach. Second, for the deterministic verification approach, the server returns the proofs of all frequent itemsets and MNB itemsets. The client checks if the server returns all the frequent itemsets from the proof. If the server does, for any pair of itemsets I i and I j such that I i & I j , the client calculates the confidence of I i ! I j to check whether it is indeed an association rule.
EXPERIMENTS
We ran a battery of experiments to evaluate the performance of our probabilistic and deterministic approaches. We also have a comparison of our two approaches.
Setup
Hardware. We run our experiment on a Intel machine with 2.4 GHz CPU, 4 GB memory, running Mac OS X 10.7.5.
Datasets. We use the IBM generator to generate four synthetic datasets S 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 , and S 4 of various sizes. We also use two real-world datasets named Retail dataset and NCDC dataset. 1 The Retail dataset is available at the Frequent Itemset Mining Dataset Repository. 2 The Retail dataset R 1 contains 88,162 transactions and 16,470 items. We also construct a small dataset R 2 from the Retail dataset that contains 500 transactions and 100 items. The NCDC dataset comes from National Climatic Data Center of U.S. Department of Commerce. Table 1 shows the details of the datasets and our mining setup. Among these datasets, the NCDC dataset is a dense dataset, in which most of the transactions are of similar length, and contain > 75 percent of items; and the R 1 dataset is a sparse dataset in which the transactions are of skewed length distribution. Due to Simulation of malicious actions. We set the error ratio p ¼ 1%; 2%; 5%; 10%, and 20%. For the simulation of incomplete result, we randomly pick p percent of frequent itemsets from the mining result and remove these picked itemsets. For the simulation of incorrect result, we randomly generate p percent of infrequent itemsets and insert them into the result.
Implementation. We implemented a prototype of our probabilistic approach in Java, and the deterministic approach in C++. We use the PBC library 3 to implement bilinear pairing, and SHA256 for the implementation of the hash function in Merkle tree construction. The accumulation values in Merkle tree are computed by using the element power function in the PBC library. The coefficients W in the proof are computed using the NTL library. 4 
Probabilistic Approach
We measure the time performance and amount of noise brought to the original dataset by our probabilistic approach. We tried various settings for a 2 ; a 1 ; b 2 and b 1 values. In particular, we use a 2 ; a 1 ¼ 0:9; 0:99; 0:999, and b 2 ; b 1 ¼ 0:9; 0:99; 0:999. On R1 dataset, we set the min sup to be 10.
Robustness
We measure the robustness of our probabilistic approach by studying the probability that the incorrect/incomplete frequent itemsets can be caught by using artificial EIs=EFs. We use the R1 dataset and vary a 1 and a 2 values to control the amount of mistakes that the server can make on the mining result. For each a 1 (a 2 , resp.) value, we simulate the incomplete (incorrect, resp.) mining result. Then with various b 1 and b 2 values, we construct artificial tuples to satisfy ða 1 ; b 1 Þ-completeness and ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness. Detection of any missing EF or the presence of any EIs will be recorded as a successful trial of catching the server. We repeat 1,000 times and record the percentage of trials (as detection probability) that the server is caught, with a 1 ; a 2 2 ½0:7; 0:9 and b 1 ; b 2 2 ½0:7; 0:9. It shows that the detection probability for the completeness and correctness verification is always higher than b 1 and b 2 respectively. This proves the robustness of our probabilistic approach. The results are omitted due to limited space.
Completeness Verification
Time performance. We measure the time performance of EF construction with various a 1 and b 1 values. Fig. 4 shows the result of using NCDC and R1 datasets. For both datasets, the time of constructing EFs grows with the increase of a 1 when b 1 ¼ 0:99 and 0:999. This is not surprising as higher completeness probability guarantee requires more EFs for verification. However, when b 1 ¼ 0:9, the EF construction time decreases when a 1 increases from 0:9 to 0:99. This is because the size of D h when a 1 ¼ 0:99 is smaller than the size of D h when a 1 ¼ 0:9. Since the construction time relies on both jEF j and jD h j, the construction time decreases when a 1 increases. Another interesting observation is that the construction time on NCDC dataset grows faster than R1 dataset. This is because the EF construction algorithm, which is driven by transaction length, will pick a large portion of transactions in NCDC dataset where most of transactions are of similar length but a small portion of transactions in R1 dataset where transaction lengths are of skewed distribution. Amounts of artificial transactions. We measured the amount of inserted artificial transactions compared with the size of the database. In particular, let t be the number of artificial transactions to be inserted, we measured the ratio r ¼ t n , where n is the number of real transactions in D. As shown in Fig. 5a , for Retail dataset, the inserted artificial transactions only take a small portion of the original database (no more than 0.01025 percent). On the other hand, we observed that the ratio of artificial transactions is not increasing with the a and b values. That is because the number of artificial tuples is bounded to the min sup , i.e., the number of artificial transactions is at most min sup À 1. We also measured the mining overhead introduced by artificial transactions. Fig. 5b shows the result. It is expected that the mining overhead is negligible.
Correctness Verification
Time performance. We measure the time for correctness verification preparation that satisfy ða 2 ; b 2 Þ-correctness on NCDC dataset. The result is shown in Fig. 6a . It is not surprising that it needs more time to construct EIs for higher a 2 and b 2 values. Furthermore, when b 2 ¼ 0:9 and 0:99, EI construction is very fast (no more than 1 second). This is because for these cases, all EIs are real infrequent itemsets; there is no need to remove any item. However, when b 2 grows to 0:999, the preparation time jumps to 400-600 seconds, since now the algorithm needs to find more itemset candidates from deeper level of the lattice to be EIs as well as the items to be removed to make EIs infrequent. We also measure the EI construction time of R1 dataset. It does not increase much when b 2 increases from 0:9 to 0:999, since all EIs are real infrequent items.
Amounts of removed items. We measure the amount of item instances that are removed by EI construction. In particular, let d be the number of item instances to be removed, we measure the ratio r ¼ d jDj . The result of NCDC dataset is shown in Fig. 6b . It can be seen that the number of item instances to be removed is a negligible portion (no more than 0.045 percent) of NCDC dataset. There is no item that is removed from R1 dataset, as it has a large number of infrequent 1-itemsets, which provides sufficient number of EI candidates. This shows that we can achieve high correctness guarantee to catch small errors by slight change of the dataset.
Outsourcing versus Mining Locally
We also compared the time of executing frequent itemset mining locally with the time of verification preparation by measuring the ratio t VP =t DM , where t VP and t DM are the time of verification preparation and frequent itemset mining. Fig. 7 shows the result of NCDC dataset. It can be seen that our verification preparation is always cheaper than mining locally. This convinces the client to outsource her data mining task to the server and prepare for verification locally with affordable overhead.
Deterministic Approach
In this section, we measure the performance of proof construction at the server side and verification at the client side and explored various factors that impact the verification performance of our deterministic approach, including various error ratio, frequent itemsets of different lengths, and different database sizes. We set the support threshold on R1 dataset to be 50.
Proof Construction at the Server Side
In this section, we show the experiments of proof preparation at the server side.
Time performance. First, we measure the time of preparing one single proof of (in)frequent itemsets of various lengths. We show the preparation time for itemsets of size up to six because in our main experiment, the size of itemsets to be verified is no more than six. As shown in Fig. 8a , the proof preparation time increases with the length of frequent itemset. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis (Section 4.8) that the complexity of proof construction is dependent on the size of mining result, not on the input dataset.
Second, we measure the total time of preparing all the proofs for verification. Fig. 8b shows the total preparation time for various error ratios. We consider the same error ratios p ¼ 1%; 2%; 5%; 10%, and 20% that we used for simulation of malicious actions. First, we observe that for correctness verification the proof preparation time increases slowly with the increase of error ratio. It is obvious that adding infrequent itemsets to the mining result leads to more MPB nodes. Indeed, the number of MPB nodes change much. For example, when p changes from 10 to 20 percent, the number of MPB nodes changes from 32 to 40. However, the total proof construction time does not increase much, since the proofs of new MPB nodes, which indeed correspond to infrequent itemsets, can be constructed very fast, due to the reason that the polynomial P j [21] used in their subset witness and set completeness witness is of low degree. Second, the result shows that the proof preparation time for completeness verification decreases when the error ratio increases. We studied how MNB nodes change when the error ratio grows. Our results show that the MNB nodes move to the higher levels of the LTST tree when more frequent itemsets are missing. This is because now those missing frequent itemsets were changed to be NB nodes, while their ancestor nodes in the LTST tree become MPB nodes. As MNB nodes are constructed from the children and sibling of MPB nodes, there are fewer MNB nodes especially due to the fact that higher LTST nodes have fewer children. For instance, when the error ratio changes from 2 to 5 percent, the number of completeness proofs changes from 33 to 27.
Proof size. First, we measure the optimization ratio of proofs for the mining results of various error ratios. We define the optimization ratio as 1 À p 1 =p 1 , where p 1 is the number of proofs by our optimization, and p 2 is the number of proofs by the basic approach. Intuitively, the closer the optimization to 1, the better. Fig. 9a displays the optimization ratio. We observe that the optimization ratio of the number of completeness proofs is very close to 1. This is because the basic verification approach needs to construct ð2 jI j À jF S jÞ proofs (for this experiment jIj ¼ 100 and jF S j ¼ 97) for completeness verification, our optimized approach only needs no more than 34 completeness proofs. This proves that our optimization can reduce the number of proofs dramatically. We also observe that the optimization ratio of the number of correctness proofs deceases when the error ratio increases. The reason is that adding infrequent itemsets into the result leads to more MPB nodes and thus the number of proofs, which decreases the optimization ratio. Nevertheless, the optimization ratio of the number of correctness proofs is high; it is at least 0:6 even when the error ratio is 20 percent.
Second, we measure the total size of the proofs for the mining result with various error ratio. Fig. 9b shows the result. It is not surprising that the trend of total size of the proofs is consistent with the trend of number of proofs (Fig. 9a) . In particular, the total size of completeness proofs decreases dramatically when the error ratio grows. The reason is similar to our analysis of the number of proofs: as MNB nodes move to the higher levels of the LTST tree, both the number of MNB nodes and the length of their corresponding itemsets decrease. This lead to the decrease of the total size of the completeness proofs. Regarding the correctness proofs, since the number of MPB nodes and the number of correctness proofs increase, the total size of correctness proofs increases.
We also measure the total size of the proofs, with MPB and MNB nodes of various lengths. It is not surprising that the size of proofs grows with itemsets of larger size, as the space complexity is dependent on the size of output frequent itemsets. We omit the results due to limited space.
Verification Time at the Client Side
First, we measure the verification time at the client side for mining result with various error ratios. From the result shown in Fig. 10a , first, we observe that both completeness and correctness verification are very fast. Second, we observe that the completeness verification time decreases dramatically when the error ratio increases from 2 to 5 percent, then keeps stable afterwards. We analyzed the reason, and it turned out that when the ratio equals to 2 percent (1 percent as well), the incomplete itemsets were caught by checking against the proofs, while for the error ratio changes to 5 percent and more, the incomplete itemsets were caught by missing at least one proper subset or one frequent 1-itemset, which is much faster than using proofs. Third, we observe that the correctness verification time drops sharply when the error ratio changes from 1 to 5 percent. The reason is that higher error ratio leads to larger chance that the client catches an infrequent itemset earlier.
When the error ratio increases from 5 to 20 percent, the verification time is stable because now the client can catch the infrequent itemset by the first trial.
To measure the scalability of our verification approach, we measure the verification time on datasets of different sizes. The result is shown in Fig. 10b . We observe that our verification scheme is very fast even for very large datasets. For example, for the dataset of 88162 transactions, it only requires 0.001045 seconds for verification.
Client versus Server
We compared the time performance at both the client and the server sides for various support threshold values. We vary the support threshold values so that the number of frequent itemsets is approximately 1, 5, and 10 percent of the number of transactions. Table 2 shows the comparison result. First, it is not surprising that the verification time at the client side increases with the growth of the number of frequent itemsets. The same pattern also holds for the server side. Second, in all of our testings, the total overhead at the client side is much smaller than that at the server side. Furthermore, the verification procedure at the client side is much faster than the mining at the server side. This proves that the client can outsource the mining task to the server, while verifying the result integrity with the cost that is cheaper than mining locally.
Scalability
We measured the time performance on the datasets of various sizes. Fig. 11a shows that the time of constructing one single proof increases with the data size. However, the proof can be constructed fast; it only needs 35 seconds even for a dataset of 10 6 records. Fig. 11b shows that the verification time does not change much with the data size, since: (1) the verification complexity is decided by the number of MII and MFI itemsets, and (2) the verification procedure always catches the first incomplete itemset by type-1/2 checking for most of the cases. Similar observations hold on the Retail dataset (88,162 transactions); it only requires 0.001045 seconds for verification. This convinces us that our approach can be used for efficient verification of outsourced frequent itemset mining.
Probabilistic versus Deterministic Approaches
We ran experiments to compare the performance of our probabilistic and deterministic approaches. Table 3 shows the comparison result on S 3 dataset of various settings. We pick the error ratios of 1 percent, and vary the probabilistic guarantee threshold from 90 to 100 percent (probability = 100% corresponds to our deterministic approach). Table 3 shows the details of the comparison result. In general, the deterministic approach brings higher overhead at the server side than the probabilistic approach. However, this is the sacrifice that we have to pay for higher result integrity guarantee. We also observe that in some cases (marked as N/A in Table 3 ), the probabilistic approach fails as it cannot provide required probabilistic correctness guarantee due to the data distribution. The deterministic approach does not have such limit.
Comparison with Existing Work
Among all the related work, [14] and [22] are the closest to ours. It has been proven that the evidence patterns constructed by the encoding method in [14] can be identified even by an attacker without priori knowledge of the data [11] . We argue that our probabilistic verification approach is robust against the attack in [11] . Besides, our probabilistic approach is more efficient. In [14] , it shows that it may take 2 seconds to generate one evidence pattern, while our method only takes 600 seconds to generate 6,900 evidence itemsets (i.e., 0.09 second per pattern).
Goodrich el al. [22] propose an efficient cryptographic approach to verify the result integrity of web-content searching by using the same set intersection verification protocol as ours. It shows that the time spent on the server to construct the proof for a query that involves two terms is between 0.35 to 0.8 seconds. Our deterministic approach requires 0.5 seconds to construct the proof for an itemset of length 2 at average, which is comparable to the performance of [22] .
RELATED WORK
The problem of verifiable computation was tackled previously by using interactive proofs [7] , probabilistically [2] , and non-interactive verifiable computing [5] . This body of theory is impractical [13] , due to the complexity of the algorithms and difficulty to use generalpurpose cryptographic techniques in practical data mining problems. To reduce the complexity, Goodrich et al. [21] design efficient cryptographic approaches to verify the correctness of keyword search by using Bilinear pairings and Merkle hash trees. A large body of work design authenticated data structures (e.g., [12] , [21] ) that provide a cryptographic proof of the answer to a query. These work focus on query evaluation and set operations. In the last decade, intensive efforts have been put on the security issues of the database-as-a-service (DaS) paradigm (e.g., [8] , [9] ). The focus is the correctness of SQL query evaluation. Only until recently some attention was paid to the security issues of the data-mining-as-a-service (DMaS) paradigm [6] , [11] . However, most of these work only focus on how to encrypt the data to protect data confidentiality and pattern privacy, while we focus on integrity verification of mining result.
There is surprisingly very little research [10] , [14] on result correctness verification in the DMaS paradigm. Among these work, only [14] focused on integrity verification methods for frequent itemset mining. Its basic idea is to insert some fake items that do not exist in the original dataset into the outsourced data; these fake items will construct a set of fake (in)frequent itemsets. The correctness of mining results is verified against the fake (in)frequent itemsets. Though effective, this method assumes that the server has no background knowledge of the items in the outsourced datasets, and thus it has equal probability to cheat on the fake and true itemsets. We argue that using fake items cannot catch our type-1 malicious server that may have some background knowledge of the original data and be able to escape the verification by distinguishing between real and fake items. We aim at designing effective verification approaches that can catch the incomplete/incorrect frequent itemsets from such a malicious server.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present two integrity verification approaches for outsourced frequent itemset mining. The probabilistic verification approach constructs evidence (in) frequent itemsets. In particular, we remove a small set of items from the original dataset and insert a small set of artificial transactions into the dataset to construct evidence (in) frequent itemsets. The deterministic approaches requires the server to construct cryptographic proofs of the mining result. The correctness and completeness are measured against the proofs with 100 percent certainty. Our experiments show the efficiency and effectiveness of our approaches.
An interesting direction to explore is to extend the model to allow the client to specify her verification needs in terms of budget (possibly in monetary format) besides precision and recall threshold. 
